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FAILURE TO REQUIRE CRIMINAL INTENT OR TO
DEFINE COST IN REGULATORY STATUTE
DENIES DUE PROCESS
State of Kansas v. Fleming Company, Inc.
339 P2d 12 (1959)
The state of Kansas brought suit to enjoin six defendants from violating
a Kansas statute which made it unlawful for any wholesaler, processor, or
distributor of dairy products to "sell any products ... for less than cost...
at the point of delivery; . . . except a person may sell either such dairy
products or expendable supplies at prices made in good faith to meet existing
lawful competition ... ."' The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed a judg-
ment in the District Court holding that the statute denied due process of
law to persons affected thereby.2
The police powers of a state have consistently been held to include the
power to establish regulations in the dairy industry so long as the regula-
tions are reasonable and employ means reasonably related to a justifiable
legislative purpose.3 Thus it is clear that the state of Kansas did have the
power under the federal constitution to make such regulations if they used
reasonable means of achieving a legitimate legislative goal. In the Fleming
case, however, the court concluded that since first, the statute did not
require criminal intent as an element of the crime, and second, the terms
"cost" and "existing lawful competition" were not defined, the requirements
of due process under the fourteenth amendment were not satisfied.
In holding that criminal intent was required, the Kansas court relied
heavily on a 1926 United States Supreme Court decision, Fairmont Creamery
Co. v. State of Minnesota,4 in which a statute forbidding creameries to pur-
chase cream at higher prices in one locality than in another was held uncon-
stitutional as denying due process of law since the statute prohibited
purchases of cream at a higher price "irrespective of motive." The court
also cited a 1912 case, Central Lumber Co. v. State of South Dakota,r in
which the Court upheld a South Dakota statute which forbade discrimina-
tion in the price of goods in different localities "for the purpose of" destroy-
ing competition. Thus on the authority of these cases, the Kansas Supreme
1 [50] Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 50-503 (Supp. 1957).
2 Both state and federal constitutional due process clauses were violated by the
Kansas statute.
3 Price v. People, 238 U.S. 446 (1915); Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183
U.S. 238 (1902); Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 (1900); Plumley v. Massachusetts,
155 U.S. 461 (1894); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1887); People v. Quality
Provision Co., 367 Ill. 610, 12 N.E.2d 615, 114 A.L.R. 1210 (1938); State v. Schlenker,
112 Iowa 642, 84 N.W. 698 (1900); Johnson v. Commissioner of Agriculture, 314 Mich.
548 (1946); State v. Crescent Creamery Co., 83 Minn. 284, 86 N.W. 107 (1901); Com-
monwealth v. Jackson, 345 Pa. 456 (1942).
4 Fairmont Creamery Co. v. State of Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927).
5 Central Lumber Co. v. State of South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157 (1912).
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Court concluded that regulatory statutes must require criminal intent in order
to satisfy due process requirements.
Upon a careful examination of the Fairmont and Central Lumber
cases, one discovers that neither specifically held that criminal intent must
be made an element of the crime in order to satisfy due process require-
ments. The Kansas court has simply implied this meaning from the words
"for the purpose of" and "irrespective of motive" which the Supreme Court
employed. That such an implication can or should be drawn is questionable.
However, assuming this was the holding of these cases, it appears that
criminal intent would not be required today. In a 1934 case, Nebbia v.
New York,6 the United States Supreme Court held that, "the guarantee of
due process ... demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbi-
trary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the object sought to be attained."'7 (Emphasis added.)
Thus it would appear that by implication, the court has overruled the
Fairmont and Central Lumber cases at least in part by saying that if the
means selected are reasonably related to the goal of the legislation, due
process requirements are satisfied. The statement in the Fleming case to the
effect that "there is nothing to indicate that the Nebbia case overruled or
made obsolete the Fairmont case ' 8 appears to be in error since the Nebbia
case was decided eight years after the Fairmont case and twenty-two years
after the Central Lumber case and apparently excludes criminal intent as
a requirement of the due process clause. Therefore it seems that the first
ground relied upon by the Kansas court would not support the holding.
The second reason cited by the Kansas court was that the statute failed
to define the terms "cost" and "existing lawful competition," and thus, due
process requirements were not met. In 1921, the Supreme Court in United
States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.,9 held that a section of the Federal Food
Control Act"0 was unconstitutional as being too vague to satisfy due process
standards." The court concluded that, ". . . a statute creating an offense
must use language which will convey to the average mind information as to
the act or fact which it intended to make criminal."'12 Applying this test
to the Fleming case, it appears that the failure to define "cost" meant that
wholesalers, distributors and processors were left to determine what account-
ing methods were to be followed in finding their cost. Further, they were
left at their peril to decide whether or not their competitors were legally
selling above cost in order to determine whether they could lower their own
0 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
7 Id., at 525.
8 339 P.2d at 17.
9 United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
10 41 Stat. 297.
11 The act made it "unlawful . . . to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or
charge in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries; .. ." and established fines or
imprisonment, or both for violators. In the court's words, "the statute . . . was ... so
indefinite as not to enable it to be known what was forbidden .. .
12 Supra note 9, at 84.
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prices to meet "existing lawful competition." Thus on the basis of the
Cohen Grocery case, it is clear that the failure to define the terms "cost"
and "existing lawful competition" in the Kansas milk statute resulted in an
unconstitutional failure to afford some comprehensible guide, rule, or in-
formation as to what must be done or avoided, so that the ordinary man
could know how to comply with its requirements.
In 1945, however, in Screws v. United States,1 the Supreme Court
upheld a criminal statute which imposed certain sanctions on those who
"willfully" violated its provisions.' 4 While the acts prohibited were some-
what vague, the court concluded that "where the punishment imposed is
only for an act knowingly done with the purpose of doing that which the
statute prohibits, the accused cannot be said to suffer from lack of warning
or knowledge that the act which he does is a violation of law."'51 Thus if the
act prohibited is understood by a given actor, and he willfully violates the
law, the resulting conviction would not be in violation of due process. This
principle was also followed by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Ragen.1'6 Therefore, on the basis of the Nebbia and Screws cases, it ap-
pears that while criminal intent need not be an element of a statutory
crime in order to satisfy due process requirements so long as the acts pro-
hibited are clearly defined, its presence may result in a somewhat vague
statute's being upheld.
In relating the foregoing discussion to the Fleming case, one concludes
that if the statute had either adequately defined "cost" and "existing lawful
competition" so that the acts prohibited were dear, or had included a
requirement of specific intent to violate the act as an element of the crime,
it would not be subject to due process attack on the ground of lack of
notice. But, in seeking to regulate the milk industry, what means could
best satisfy this purpose? In defining such terms as "cost" and "existing
lawful competition," many problems arise due to the complexity and great
variety of factors involved in the dairy industry. The legislature would
probably be forced to simply require that recognized accounting procedures
be employed in determining cost. Any definition of "existing lawful competi-
tion" would probably be even less adequate. To simply add a requirement
of specific intent might satisfy due process requirements on the basis of the
Screws case but would not adequately serve the legislative purpose since the
necessity of proving willfullness would greatly hamper the regulatory effect
of the statute. Perhaps the best means of achieving the desired regulation in
this complex industry would be to establish an administrative agency. Such
an agency would have the advantage of employing specialists in the dairy
field who were qualified to establish the most desirable regulatory policies
13 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
14 18 U.S.C. § 242 provides, "whoever, under color of any law . . . willfully
subjects, . . . any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws
of the United States ... shall be fined... or imprisoned ......
15 Supra note 13, at 102.
16 United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513 (1942).
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and who were in the best position to study and select the most desirable
methods of implementing these policies. Such a body could establish checks
on wholesalers, processors, and distributors to insure that they knew of the
pertinent regulations and complied with them. This specialized adminis-
trative agency could certainly handle the complex and ever changing prob-
lems involved in this industry much better than the legislature.
Edward F. Whipps
